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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Cunico v. Pueblo Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 431
Author: Judge Theis, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Cunico, worked for defendant, Pueblo School District (the
"District"), as a social worker. When the District began to experience
financial difficulties, the need for lay-offs arose. Of the eight social
workers, the District kept only the two most senior. Cunico was third in
seniority and was consequently fired. The District later rehired a minority as a means of furthering its affirmative action program. Cunico subsequently brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging she
was discriminated against by the District. The District appealed the district court's order granting relief to Cunico.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The
court noted that the purpose of a race-conscious affirmative action program must be to remedy the effects of past discrimination against a disadvantaged group. Because the District could not establish a past
record of discrimination giving rise to the need for an affirmative action
program, the decision to retain the minority social worker solely on the
basis of race was impermissible.
Derstein v. Kansas, 915 F.2d 1410
Author: Judge Seth
Plaintiff, Derstein, brought a civil rights suit against three state district court judges, alleging he was unlawfully terminated from his job as
a court services officer in response to allegations of sexual harassment.
The district court ruled in favor of Derstein, awarding him damages for
lost income, and mental and emotional distress. Derstein was also reinstated as a state employee. The judges appealed, claiming that: (1) the
district court erred in denying their claims for qualified immunity;
(2) Derstein had no protected property interest; (3) they were entitled
to eleventh amendment immunity; and (4) the damage award was not
supported by substantial evidence. Derstein cross-appealed, claiming he
was denied a liberty interest.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling in favor of
Derstein. The court ruled that Derstein was provided due process because he was not discharged until ten days after receiving notice of the
charges against him. Accordingly, the court stated that it need not address the judges' remaining claims on appeal. The court also dismissed
Derstein's cross-appeal because no liberty interest was impinged when
he publicized the circumstances of his discharge.
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DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-SilasMason Co., 911 F.2d 1377
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, DeVargas, brought a civil rights suit against defendants,
Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Company, Incorporated ("Mason &
Hanger"), contract suppliers of security services to Los Alamos National
Laboratories ("LANL") and individual managers of LANL. DeVargas
argued defendants violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 when they refused to hire him for a security inspector position because of a physical handicap. The district court
granted summaryjudgment in favor of Mason-Hanger and the managers
of LANL.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Mason & Hanger, holding that section 504 did not apply to the company.
Section 504 prohibits discrimination against handicapped persons by
"any program or activity receiving financial assistance." The court explained that since Mason & Hanger received a competitive bid contract
to provide security services, it was not the recipient of a government
subsidy. The court also upheld the grant of summary judgment to the
individual LANL managers. The court explained that the district court
properly relied upon Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624
(1984), which held that section 504's prohibition against discrimination
extended only to specific programs receiving federal assistance. The
district court appropriately determined that Mason & Hanger, not
LANL, employed a specific program that discriminated against DeVargas. The court found no congressional intent to give retroactive application to the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987.
Hill v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Inc., 918 F.2d 877
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Hill, brought suit against defendant, Goodyear Tire &
Rubber, Incorporated ("Goodyear"), under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Hill contended that Goodyear discharged him in retaliation for his civil rights
advocacy and discharged him because of his race. The jury found in
favor of Goodyear, and Hill appealed the following district court rulings:
(1) denying an injunction against Goodyear's maintenance of a hostile
work environment; (2) refusing to give three jury instructions concerning Hill's claim for hostile work environment; (3) directing a verdict on
Hill's claim for retaliatory discharge on the basis that retaliation does
not state a claim for relief under § 1981; and (4) admitting evidence of
Hill's bad character. Hill also alleged that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict in favor of Goodyear.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the district court properly refused to
issue an injunction against Goodyear or instruct the jury on Hill's hostile
work environment claim. Moreover, the district court properly refused
to submit Hill's retaliatory discharge claim to the jury because Hill's discharge, even if in retaliation for his civil rights advocacy, was not action-

1991]

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

able under § 1981. Further, the court declined to decide whether
discriminatory discharge claims were still actionable under § 1981. Finally, the admission of evidence concerning Hill's character was not
plain error, and the record contained substantial evidence to support
the jury's verdict.
Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Hirschfeld, brought suit against the New Mexico Corrections Department ("NMCD") alleging gender-based discrimination, retaliation for complaints of sexual harassment, and constructive
discharge. Hirschfeld alleged that while working at NMCD, the Captain
of the security officers made unwelcome sexual advances. The district
court found that the Captain was an agent of the NMCD and found that
his conduct created a hostile work environment. The district court
ruled, however, that NMCD was not liable for its employee's conduct,
reasoning that the sexual harassment was not aided by the agency relationship. Hirschfeld subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Hirschfeld's complaint. The court identified three alternative bases for holding an employer liable for an agent's creation of a hostile work
environment: (1) the agent is acting within the scope of his employment; (2) the employer fails to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive
work environment of which management-level employees knew, or in
the exercise of reasonable care should have known; or (3) the agent,
although acting outside the scope of his authority, purported to act or
speak on behalf of the employer and there was reliance upon the apparent authority. The court found no liability under any of these tests.
First, the court ruled that the district court properly held NMCD not
liable under the first test because the Captain was not acting within the
scope of his employment in his actions towards Hirschfeld. Furthermore, the district court correctly held no liability under the second test
because NMCD took prompt remedial action after receiving notice of
the sexual harassment. Specifically, the Captain was demoted. Third,
the court ruled that there was no evidence indicating that the Captain
had any supervisory authority over Hirschfeld's position. Accordingly,
the Captain did not act or speak on behalf of NMCD. Thus, there was
no employer liability under the third test. Finally, the court ruled that
the district court properly dismissed Hirschfeld's constructive discharge
claim. -The district court's decision that Hirschfeld's evidence was not
credible was not clearly erroneous.
Krause v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d 674
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Krause, was terminated at age fifty-two after being employed by defendant, Dresser Industries Incorporated ("Dresser"), for
over twenty-five years. Krause filed suit claiming: (1) age discrimina-
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tion; (2) violation of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"); and (3) breach of an implied employment contract. The
jury returned a verdict for Krause on all three claims. Dresser appealed,
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdicts.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court reasoned that the evidence produced allowed a reasonable jury to
determine that age was a determining factor in Krause's termination of
employment, and that Dresser breached an implied contract with
Krause. The court explained that Krause offered sufficient evidence to
rebut Dresser's non-discriminatory explanation for termination. Also,
there was sufficient evidence to establish an implied promise that Krause
would not be terminated until after employees of lower seniority were
terminated. The court also ruled that since a breach of contract claim
solely for lost salary is unrelated to an employee benefit plan, Krause's
contract claim was not preempted by ERISA.
Marshall v. TRW, Inc., 900 F.2d 1517
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Marshall, brought a retaliatory discharge action against his
employer, TRW Incorporated ("TRW"). Specifically, Marshall claimed
that TRW terminated his employment because he filed a workers' compensation claim arising out of injuries sustained in the course of employment. The jury found in favor of Marshall for $150,000 in actual
damages and $125,000 in punitive damages. Also, since there was hostility in the work place, reinstatement was found to be an inappropriate
remedy. Instead, the district court awarded $250,000 in future damages. TRW subsequently appealed, alleging: (1) Marshall's state tort
claim of retaliatory discharge was pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act; (2) there was no evidence of hostility in the
work place, and in any event, the evidence does not support an award of
$250,000 in future damages; (3) the punitive damage award should be
reduced to $100,000; and (4) the district court erred in excluding evidence concerning the availability of the arbitration remedy.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings, except the
judgment for future damages. First, the court stated that Marshall's
state tort claim was not pre-empted by § 301. The court reasoned that
whether Marshall's discharge was retaliatory did not involve interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). Thus, since the
state-law remedy was independent of the CBA, there was no pre-emption by any federal labor laws. Second, the court reversed the judgment
awarding future damages. The court stated that there was nothing in
the record to support a finding of hostility. Third, the court ruled that
the punitive damages were appropriate. The court stated that
Oklahoma's cap on punitive damages awards in retaliatory discharge actions does not apply retroactively to an action commenced before the
statute's effective date. Finally, the court stated that the availability of
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arbitration was immaterial. The court reasoned that the state law remedy was independent of remedies provided for in the CBA.
Messina v. Kroblin Transp. Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1306
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Messina, brought suit against Kroblin Transportation Systems, Incorporated ("Kroblin") claiming he was unlawfully terminated
in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").
Messina's action also contained a pendent state law slander claim. The
jury found in favor of Kroblin, and he subsequently appealed. On appeal, Messina contended the district court erred in instructing the jury.
He alleged the instruction incorrectly required him to prove the ultimate question of the trial, whether age was the determinative factor in
his discharge. Second, Messina alleged the district court erred in directing a verdict against him on his slander claim. Finally, Messina argued the district court erred on failing to admit into evidence the
conduct of certain defense witnesses who violated a sequestration order.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. The jury instruction was not improper. The court explained that the instruction
did not mislead the jury. Moreover, the court stated that it only reverses
ajury instruction when it has a substantial doubt that the jury was fairly
guided in its deliberations. Furthermore, the court found that the district court properly held against Messina on his slander claim. The
court explained that Messina failed to satisfy the requirement that the
slanderous statements be communicated to others beside the plaintiff.
It reasoned that the slanderous statements in question were made by
one corporate employee during the performance of his duties within the
hearing of other corporate employees. This does not constitute publication. Finally, the district court properly balanced the interests of Messina in presenting his case with the prejudice that would arise if the jury
knew that the witness misconduct caused a new trial. Moreover, the district court allowed Messina to cross examine the witnesses who violated
the sequestration order.
Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp., 896 F.2d 463
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Mitchell, filed suit claiming that when defendant, Mobil Oil
Corporation ("Mobil") raised the eligibility threshold for lump-sum payments, it forced him to take early retirement. Consequently, Mitchell
argued that Mobil violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). The district court entered judgment for Mitchell on the ADEA
claim and ruled in favor of Mitchell on the ERISA claims. On appeal,
Mobil contended that Mitchell did not meet his burden of proof on the
age discrimination claim, and that he did not have standing to seek relief
under ERISA.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with Mobil and reversed the decision of
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the district court. The court explained that when an employee has established a prima facie case of age discrimination by constructive discharge, the employer may rebut the presumption of discrimination by
producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason
for its conduct. To prevail, the employee must then prove that the employer's proffered justification is a mere pretext for discrimination.
Mitchell failed to do this. The court reasoned that his claim of pretext
was based on an unsupported inference that Mobil changed its benefit
plan to avoid the redundancy created by its forthcoming merger with
another oil company. The court rejected this inference. Moreover,
Mitchell did not have standing to seek relief under ERISA because he
was no longer a participant of an employee benefit plan after taking a
lump-sum distribution.
Polson v. Davis, 895 F.2d 705
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Polson, an employee of Kansas City, Kansas, contended
that her relationship with defendant, Davis, deteriorated after she objected to his alleged discriminatory hiring policies. Poison was fired for
"unprofessional conduct." Poison subsequently brought suit under various employment discrimination claims. The district court held for Davis, and Poison appealed. On appeal, Poison contended that the district
court erred when it: (1) failed to instruct the jury on the theory of defamation per se, which does not require proof of actual damages;
(2) granted summary judgment to Davis on her state retaliatory discharge claim; (3) granted summary judgment to Davis on her claim that
the City was negligent in supervising her immediate superior, Davis;
(4) rejected her Title VII claim, finding the statute's enforcement provisions to be the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination suits
premised on its violation; and (5) refused to grant a new trial based on
instances of improper testimony.
The Tenth Circuit found that the Kansas Supreme Court abolished
the distinction between defamation per quod and defamation per se, and
that defamation could no longer be presumed, but must be established
by proof. Second, the court held that Poison's situation could not be
classified under the public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine since the alternative remedy under the Kansas Acts Against
Discrimination was adequate. Thus, summary judgment on her state retaliatory discharge claim was proper. Third, the court found that the
negligent supervision cause of action did not exist in Kansas. Fourth,
although the court agreed that Poison could bring a § 1983 claim on
actions proscribed by Title VII if those actions also violated the Constitution, the jury's finding that Poison's termination did not violate equal
protection resolved this issue against her. Finally, the court ruled that
the improper testimony did not deny justice, and Poison's prior refusal
of a mistrial barred her from seeking a new trial.
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Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Spulak, brought suit against K Mart Corporation ("K
Mart") under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29
U.S.C. § 621, alleging that defendant, K Mart, illegally discharged him
because of his age. He also asserted a pendant state claim for age discrimination and for extreme and outrageous conduct. Spulak prevailed
on the ADEA claim and was awarded back pay, liquidated damages, and
front pay in lieu of reinstatement. K Mart subsequently appealed. The
issues on appeal were whether Spulak established a violation of ADEA
and whether the damages awarded were appropriate.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court accepted the findings of the district court that Spulak was singled
out for unduly harsh and discriminatory treatment, and that he established a case of constructive discharge. Moreover, the court found that
his age, his employment record, and his constructive discharge established a primafacie case of age discrimination. The court also approved
the district court's award of damages. Liquidated damages were appropriate because age discrimination was the predominant motive for Spulak's constructive discharge. Reinstatement, rather than front pay, is the
preferred remedy. It was not appropriate in this case, however, because
K Mart exhibited such extreme hostility that, as a practical matter, a productive and amicable working relationship was impossible.
Torrez v. Public Serv. Co., 908 F.2d 687
Author: Judge Jones, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Torrez, appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, Public Service Company of New
Mexico ("PNM"). The district court found that the signing of a release
by Torrez at the termination of his employment constituted a knowing
and voluntary waiver of his right to bring an employment discrimination
suit. On appeal, Torrez argued that: (1) the district court considered
only the language of the release, and not the totality of the circumstances; (2) he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to
bring a discrimination action; and (3) his intent and understanding
should not have been decided by summary judgment.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for PNM. The court reasoned that the totality of the
circumstances was not considered. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c),
summary judgment should only be granted if there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. In assessing the totality of the circumstances, the court
concluded that there were material issues. For example, the release
failed to specifically mention waiver of employment discrimination
claims. Furthermore, Torrez did not consult with an attorney before he
signed the release, nor did PNM advise him to do so. Moreover, Torrez
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did not have the opportunity to negotiate terms of the standard release
form; in fact, he was required to sign it. Finally, Torrez testified that he
viewed the release as releasing only those claims arising out of the termination plan. He did not understand the release, however, to be a bar
to bringing a discrimination claim.
Baker v. The Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Baker, brought two causes of action against her employer,
The Weyerhaeuser Company ("Weyerhaeuser"), as a result of being
sexually harassed by a fellow employee. First, she alleged that pursuant
to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), Weyerhaeuser knowingly allowed sexual harassment in the workplace, thereby creating a hostile environment. Baker's second cause of action was that Weyerhaeuser inflicted
emotional distress by outrageous conduct. The district court entered
judgment for Baker on both causes of action, and Weyerhaeuser subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. First,
the district court's decision that Weyerhaeuser violated Title VII was
supported by the record. There was pervasive sexual harassment of
Baker by a coworker. Weyerhaeuser, through Baker's supervisors and
others, knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take
corrective measures. The court also affirmed the intentional infliction of
emotional distress determination. The court explained that the district
court properly declined to base Weyerhaeuser's liability on the theory of
respondeat superior. This would have required a finding that the coworker's harassment was committed in the course of, and in furtherance
of, his employment. Rather, the district court properly premised liability on Weyerhaeuser's own conduct, namely, its utter failure to take action against the coworker.

